The Prop Firm Revolution: How Kraken's Breakout Acquisition Signals Crypto's Next Talent War (2025)

Introduction

The cryptocurrency industry has witnessed countless innovations, but few developments reveal as much about the future of digital asset trading as Kraken's September 2025 acquisition of Breakout, a crypto-focused proprietary trading firm. This move, unprecedented in its implications, signals that major exchanges are no longer content to simply provide infrastructure. They are now actively hunting for trading talent through a model that has exploded in popularity yet remains controversial: proprietary trading firms that fund skilled traders in exchange for profit splits.

Prop firms have existed in traditional finance for decades, but their modern incarnation as online talent-screening platforms has created a multi-hundred-million-dollar industry almost overnight. These companies promise aspiring traders the chance to control substantial capital without risking personal funds, if they can pass rigorous evaluations. The model sounds too good to be true, and for most participants, it is. Yet the involvement of a regulated, institutional-grade exchange like Kraken suggests these platforms are evolving from fringe operations into legitimate components of the trading ecosystem.

This article examines how proprietary trading firms operate, why they have grown explosively despite regulatory scrutiny and controversies, and what Kraken's strategic bet on Breakout reveals about the future of cryptocurrency trading. The story is one of innovation, exploitation, consolidation, and ultimately, the democratization of trading capital in ways that challenge traditional finance's gatekeeping mechanisms.

The Prop Firm Business Model: Meritocracy or Mirage?

How Modern Prop Firms Actually Work

The contemporary prop firm model differs dramatically from traditional proprietary trading operations. Historically, prop trading desks at investment banks deployed the firm's capital through in-house traders who were employees. The modern retail-focused variant flips this relationship. Firms like FTMO, the Czech pioneer that helped establish the current model, recruit independent traders globally through fee-based evaluations.

Here's the proposition: pay several hundred dollars for a trading "challenge" where you must demonstrate consistent profitability while adhering to strict risk management rules. Meet the targets (typically 8 to 10 percent profit within defined time periods and maximum drawdown limits), and the firm provides a funded account ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 dollars or more. Trade profitably on this account, and you keep 70 to 90 percent of the profits. Fail the challenge, and the fee is typically non-refundable.

The economics are straightforward and brutally efficient. FTMO's CEO has acknowledged that while tens of thousands attempt their evaluations, only around 4,000 traders were actively funded at a given time during their peak growth phase [1]. The failure rate exceeds 90 percent. This creates a revenue structure where challenge fees from the many subsidize payouts to the few. One regulatory complaint revealed that My Forex Funds, once among the largest prop firms, collected over 310 million dollars in fees from approximately 135,000 customers [2]. The firm paid out a fraction of that amount before regulators intervened.

Most prop firms use simulated trading environments for evaluations and often for funded accounts as well. This means when a trader "fails," no real market losses occur for the firm. When a trader succeeds, the firm can choose to hedge those positions in real markets or simply pay out from the pool of collected fees. This structure keeps the firm's risk remarkably low while generating substantial cash flow from aspiring traders willing to pay for a shot at trading with significant capital.

The Revenue Reality: Challenge Fees Drive Growth

FTMO provides a useful case study in prop firm economics. The company achieved over 213 million dollars in turnover in 2023, representing 20 percent year-over-year growth [3]. Earlier in their trajectory, they experienced explosive expansion with revenue growth exceeding 39,000 percent between 2017 and 2020, earning recognition in Deloitte's Fast 50 rankings [1]. While FTMO reported paying out 29 million dollars to traders in 2021, this represented a small fraction of their revenue during a period of explosive growth [4].

The model's sustainability relies on volume and repeated attempts. European regulators, increasingly scrutinized these operations, bluntly describe the dynamic. Belgium's FSMA stated that prop firm courses and tests are "not easy, not cheap and often consumers have to take, and pay for, several of them. There is a good chance that some consumers never pass. This is how prop trading firms earn money from them" [5].

This is not necessarily fraudulent. The firms are transparent about difficulty (though perhaps not transparent enough about actual pass rates). They argue they are providing valuable education and filtering for genuine talent. The successful traders they fund represent the justification for the model. Yet the question remains whether this constitutes a legitimate talent incubation system or an expensive lottery where the house always wins.

From Forex Fringe to Crypto Mainstream: The Industry's Explosive Growth

The 1000 Percent Decade

The retail-focused prop firm industry experienced growth that makes even cryptocurrency's bull runs look modest. Between 2015 and 2024, the sector expanded over 1000 percent, far outpacing traditional brokerage growth [6]. The Covid-era retail trading boom accelerated this trend, with social media marketing driving torrents of aspiring traders toward platforms promising funded accounts.

FTMO alone created nearly 1 million accounts (including free trials) by 2021 and was executing approximately 90 million trades annually on its platforms [4]. The company's reach extended to traders in over 180 countries, creating a truly global marketplace for trading talent. Dozens of competitors emerged, each tweaking profit splits, evaluation criteria, or asset offerings to attract customers.

This growth phase resembled a gold rush. Entrepreneurs recognized that with relatively low capital requirements (primarily for technology infrastructure and marketing), they could tap into the enormous pool of aspiring traders worldwide. The model's unit economics were compelling: collect fees from thousands, pay out to hundreds, and profit from the difference. For traders, the value proposition seemed equally clear: risk a few hundred dollars for a chance at a six-figure account.

The 2024 Consolidation: 100 Firms Disappear

The boom inevitably led to a shakeout. In 2024 alone, an estimated 80 to 100 prop trading firms ceased operations [7]. This represented a brutal consolidation that exposed the industry's speculative excesses and separated sustainable businesses from opportunistic ventures.

Several factors drove this collapse. MetaQuotes, the provider of MetaTrader platforms that most forex prop firms relied upon, stopped licensing to prop firms, disrupting business operations for many companies [8]. More fundamentally, competition intensified and customer expectations evolved. Pass rates declined across the industry as firms tightened criteria to manage risk, leading to trader dissatisfaction and complaints about deliberately difficult challenges designed to maximize fee collection.

Smaller firms lacked the capital reserves to weather reputational damage or operational challenges. When a prop firm closes, traders can lose pending payouts and the firm's obligations effectively vanish. The 2024 consolidation eliminated many marginal operators, but it also demonstrated the industry's volatility and lack of consumer protection.

Survivors of this consolidation wave were forced to become more sophisticated. The largest firms began acquiring regulated entities or seeking licenses to establish legitimacy. Challenge pass rates and payout transparency became competitive differentiators. The wild west phase was ending; the question was whether prop firms could mature into legitimate financial services or would remain fundamentally predatory operations dressed in meritocratic language.

Kraken's Strategic Bet: Bringing Prop Trading to Crypto

Why a Major Exchange Bought a Prop Firm

Kraken's acquisition of Breakout in September 2025 represents a watershed moment for both the prop firm industry and cryptocurrency exchanges [9]. Kraken, one of the world's largest and most respected cryptocurrency exchanges, brought institutional credibility and regulatory infrastructure to a business model that had existed primarily in forex's less-regulated corners.

Breakout, launched in 2023, was among the first prop firms focused exclusively on cryptocurrency trading. It applied the evaluation-based funding model to crypto assets, offering traders the chance to access up to 200,000 dollars in capital with up to 5x leverage on crypto pairs, keeping up to 90 percent of profits [10]. For crypto traders, this represented the same proposition that forex traders had been pursuing: trade large positions without personal capital risk.

Kraken's leadership framed the acquisition around meritocracy. Co-CEO Arjun Sethi stated the goal is allocating capital "based on proof of skill rather than access to capital," rewarding performance over pedigree [11]. This philosophical positioning matters. It suggests Kraken sees prop trading not as a marketing gimmick but as a fundamental shift in how trading capital gets deployed, moving from traditional credentialing (employment, investment minimums, accreditation) toward demonstrated ability.

The Strategic Logic: Talent, Volume, and Ecosystem Building

Kraken's move makes sense across multiple dimensions. First, it addresses a talent acquisition problem. Skilled crypto traders are scarce and expensive to employ. By offering funded accounts, Kraken can essentially crowdsource trading talent, identifying and backing capable traders globally without employment overhead. Those traders then generate volume on Kraken's platform, earning the exchange trading fees.

Second, during bear markets or periods of declining trading volumes, a prop trading program can attract new users and maintain engagement. Aspiring traders who might otherwise leave crypto during quiet periods have a reason to stay active: working toward earning a funded account. This creates stickiness that pure spot or derivatives offerings cannot match.

Third, Kraken had been assembling a suite of advanced trading tools. In recent years, they acquired NinjaTrader (a futures brokerage) and a no-code trading automation firm [12]. The Breakout acquisition completes a vision of serving sophisticated traders across multiple dimensions: providing infrastructure, automation tools, education, evaluation, and ultimately capital. This ecosystem approach could differentiate Kraken from exchanges that merely offer order books and matching engines.

Finally, there's a defensive element. If prop trading is emerging as a new category of trading services, Kraken wanted to be positioned early. Better to integrate this functionality directly than watch competitors or independent platforms capture the trader talent that Kraken's infrastructure could support.

Integration and Product Vision

Kraken immediately began integrating Breakout's evaluation-based funding into its advanced trading platform (Kraken Pro). The plan is to offer a seamless experience where users can attempt evaluations, receive funded accounts, and trade on Kraken's infrastructure without friction [13]. This contrasts with independent prop firms that typically use separate platforms and may not even execute trades on real markets.

Breakout's co-founder emphasized that their evaluation "is not simulation for simulation's sake. It is a filter for scalable signal" [14]. This language reveals the underlying logic: prop firms are talent discovery mechanisms. By putting aspiring traders through structured challenges with real risk management requirements, firms can identify those with genuine edge. For an exchange, acquiring this filtering capability means access to a curated pool of profitable traders who can add liquidity and sophisticated flow to the platform.

The integration also allows Kraken to leverage its regulatory status. As a licensed exchange operating in multiple jurisdictions, Kraken can potentially offer a more compliant framework for prop trading in crypto, addressing some of the regulatory ambiguity that has plagued forex-focused firms. Whether regulators will view exchange-integrated prop trading more favorably than standalone operations remains unclear, but the institutional backing certainly changes the perception.

Controversies and Regulatory Crosshairs

The My Forex Funds Saga: A Cautionary Tale

Not all prop firms deserve the benefit of the doubt that institutional backing might provide. The case of My Forex Funds (MFF) exposed the darkest possibilities of the prop firm model. In August 2023, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a lawsuit accusing MFF and its owner of operating a fraudulent scheme [2].

The allegations were damning. The CFTC claimed MFF's trading operated entirely on a demo environment with the firm acting as counterparty to all trades, meaning no client trades actually reached real markets. According to the complaint, MFF used software to engineer trader losses by injecting artificial slippage and hidden fees to tilt odds against participants passing evaluations. Most troubling, the CFTC alleged the business was "tantamount to a Ponzi scheme," where payouts to successful traders came not from profitable trading but directly from fees collected from new customers [2].

The case initially sent shockwaves through the industry. Rival firms, including FTMO, moved to limit U.S. exposure, likely to avoid regulatory scrutiny [15]. It appeared that prop firms would face a reckoning that could expose systematic exploitation.

Then the case took an extraordinary turn. In May 2025, a judge dismissed the CFTC's lawsuit with prejudice after evidence emerged of prosecutorial misconduct [16]. The CFTC was found to have made false statements and withheld exonerating information, including mischaracterizing a routine tax payment as an illicit fund transfer. The judge sanctioned the CFTC and ordered it to pay MFF's legal fees [17].

This was a technical victory for MFF based on procedural failures, not a vindication of their business practices. Legal analysts noted the dismissal did not address the underlying allegations about the business model. The accusations themselves remain a roadmap of regulatory concerns: demo trading presented as real execution, artificial barriers to passing evaluations, and profit distributions that depend on new customer fees rather than genuine trading profits.

MFF hinted at a potential return to the market following the dismissal [18]. Whether they can rebuild trust or whether the controversy permanently tainted their brand remains to be seen. What's certain is that the case demonstrated both the predatory potential of prop firms and the challenges regulators face in policing this gray area.

Regulatory Warnings and Industry Cleanup

Beyond MFF, the prop firm industry has faced mounting regulatory scrutiny across multiple jurisdictions. European financial authorities in Belgium, Italy, and Spain issued warnings in 2023-2024, describing prop firm programs as "shadow investment games" that exploit consumers by charging for repeatedly difficult challenges that most never pass [5].

The concerns center on several issues. First, prop firms often present themselves as educational or employment opportunities rather than trading services, potentially circumventing investor protection regulations. Second, the evaluation model's economics depend on failure, creating perverse incentives. Third, the lack of transparency around pass rates, payout reliability, and whether trades reach real markets leaves consumers vulnerable to exploitation.

Other controversies have emerged. In late 2024, a firm called FundedFirm collapsed amid revelations it had falsified payout figures, claiming 95 million dollars paid to traders when the real number was one-tenth that amount [19]. The firm even plagiarized a competitor's entire website, suggesting it was never a serious operation. These scandals, combined with the wave of closures in 2024, have created pressure for regulatory intervention and industry self-regulation.

Established firms are responding. FTMO's acquisition of OANDA, a well-established retail forex broker with licenses in multiple jurisdictions, signals a move toward regulatory compliance and operational legitimacy [3]. By owning a regulated broker, FTMO can integrate brokerage services and leverage regulatory infrastructure, potentially converting its prop business from an unregulated edge case into a licensed financial service.

The regulatory outlook remains uncertain. Prop firms do not fit neatly into existing categories. They are not investment funds (users are not pooling capital), brokers (they are not executing client trades in the traditional sense), or commodity pools. Positioning themselves as evaluation services with performance bonuses has allowed them to operate in gray areas. How long this positioning survives increased regulatory attention depends on whether authorities see these firms as innovative talent platforms or as exploitation engines that need to be brought under consumer protection frameworks.

Critical Analysis: Opportunity, Exploitation, or Both?

The Case for Prop Firms: Democratizing Trading Capital

The strongest argument for prop firms is that they break down traditional barriers to accessing trading capital. Historically, if you wanted to trade significant capital, you needed substantial personal wealth, employment at a financial institution, or the ability to attract investors. Each path favored those with existing resources, credentials, or networks.

Prop firms eliminate these gatekeepers. A talented trader in Lagos, Manila, or Warsaw can demonstrate skill and receive funding without a finance degree, connections, or personal capital beyond a few hundred dollars for evaluation fees. This is genuinely democratizing in ways traditional finance never was. The model rewards demonstrated ability rather than pedigree.

Moreover, the structure forces good habits. The evaluation criteria typically include maximum drawdown limits, daily loss caps, and profit targets that require consistency rather than lucky gambles. Traders must develop risk management discipline to pass. Those who succeed have proven they can generate profits within defined risk parameters, exactly the skill set institutional traders need. In this sense, prop firms function as harsh but effective training grounds.

The profit splits, typically 80 to 90 percent to the trader, are far more generous than employment relationships where traders might keep 10 to 20 percent of profits they generate for a firm. For successful participants, the economics are compelling: trade with someone else's capital, keep most of the profits, and risk only the evaluation fee rather than personal savings.

Documented success stories support this narrative. Some traders have generated six-figure incomes through prop-funded accounts [20]. FTMO has paid out tens of millions of dollars to traders, demonstrating that profitable traders can and do succeed in this model. The firms' own survival depends on identifying and retaining successful traders, creating alignment between firm and trader interests once someone gets funded.

The Case Against: Selling Expensive Dreams

The counterargument is equally compelling. The overwhelming majority of participants lose money. With pass rates under 10 percent and many traders attempting multiple challenges, the typical outcome is spending hundreds or thousands of dollars without ever receiving funding. For most people, prop firms are not a pathway to trading capital but rather an expensive education in how difficult consistently profitable trading actually is.

The business model's reliance on failure creates troubling incentives. Firms profit when you pay and fail. They share profits when you succeed. Which outcome benefits them more? In the early stages, when most traders are attempting evaluations, the firm makes far more from fees than it pays out. This suggests the evaluation is designed to be passed by very few, not to maximize the discovery of trading talent.

Regulatory criticisms highlight this dynamic. Belgium's FSMA described prop trading as consumers having to "take, and pay for, several" courses before potentially succeeding, with a "good chance that some consumers never pass" [5]. This is how the firms earn money. It's not a partnership; it's a commercial transaction where one party is statistically likely to lose.

Moreover, the psychological impact can be destructive. The promise of accessing large capital creates powerful FOMO (fear of missing out). Traders can become trapped in a cycle of "just one more attempt," repeatedly paying fees in pursuit of an opportunity that may never materialize. This resembles gambling addiction dynamics more than talent development.

The lack of transparency compounds these concerns. Most firms do not publish actual pass rates or payout data. Traders do not know if their challenges are being fairly evaluated or if the firm uses software to ensure failure rates remain high enough to support the business model. The MFF allegations, even if not proven in court, revealed what's possible: firms could theoretically manipulate demo environments to engineer the outcomes they want.

Finally, there's the question of whether "prop trading" is even the right term. Traditional prop traders were employees who traded firm capital. Modern prop firm participants are customers who pay for evaluations and performance bonuses if successful. Calling it employment or partnership obscures the commercial reality: you are buying a service, and the firm profits whether you succeed or fail.

The Verdict: A System That Works for Very Few

The most honest assessment is that prop firms provide genuine opportunity for a small percentage of exceptionally skilled and disciplined traders while functioning as expensive education for everyone else. Whether this constitutes a fair system depends on whether you view trading talent as something rare that should be difficult to prove or whether you see the model as profiting from unrealistic aspirations.

Kraken's institutional validation suggests the former interpretation is gaining ground. If a major, regulated exchange is willing to integrate prop trading into its core offerings, this implies they see value beyond fee collection. They are betting that filtering for trading skill produces traders worth backing and that this talent discovery mechanism justifies the structure.

The industry's maturation may address some concerns. As firms acquire licenses, increase transparency, and face regulatory oversight, the worst practices could be eliminated. Consolidation has already removed many fly-by-night operations. What remains may be a smaller number of more professional firms that genuinely do serve as talent incubators, albeit ones with harsh entry requirements.

For individuals considering participating in prop trading challenges, the calculus is straightforward: treat evaluation fees as tuition for trading education, not as an investment. Assume you will fail and will need multiple attempts. Only participate with money you can afford to lose. Research firms thoroughly to avoid scams and focus on those with track records of actually paying out to successful traders. Understand that the odds are against you, and that even if you pass, maintaining consistent profitability in a funded account requires skills most people do not possess.

The democratization narrative is real but incomplete. Prop firms have opened doors that were previously closed. They have funded traders who never would have accessed capital through traditional paths. But they have also taken evaluation fees from hundreds of thousands of people who never received funding and likely never will. Both realities coexist in a model that is neither purely exploitative nor purely meritocratic, but rather a harsh, expensive filter that rewards the few at the cost of the many.

The Future: Regulation, Integration, and Evolution

Regulatory Frameworks on the Horizon

The prop firm industry cannot remain in its current regulatory limbo indefinitely. European authorities are clearly moving toward formal oversight, with warnings from multiple national regulators suggesting forthcoming enforcement actions or new rules. The U.S., despite the MFF case's dismissal, has signaled intent to apply existing anti-fraud and commodity trading laws to prop firms that make false claims or manipulate outcomes.

The challenge for regulators is classification. Prop firms do not fit neatly into existing categories, allowing them to operate in gray areas. This will likely change as authorities develop frameworks specifically for performance-based funding models. Possible regulatory outcomes include requiring disclosure of actual pass rates, mandating transparency about whether trades reach real markets, imposing licensing requirements similar to broker-dealers, or creating consumer protection rules around evaluation fees and payout obligations.

Established firms appear to be welcoming regulation, at least rhetorically. FTMO's acquisition of a regulated broker suggests preparation for a more compliance-heavy environment. Industry observers have noted that regulation could help by eliminating bad actors and establishing minimum standards, giving consumers more confidence in the model [21]. However, heavy-handed regulation could also kill the model entirely if compliance costs become prohibitive for all but the largest firms.

Exchange Integration and New Business Models

Kraken's acquisition of Breakout points toward a future where prop trading becomes a standard feature of major trading platforms rather than a separate industry. Other exchanges may follow this path, either through acquisitions or by building evaluation-based funding programs internally.

This integration could address some of the trust issues that plague independent prop firms. Exchanges already operate under regulatory oversight, maintain segregated customer funds, and have reputational incentives to treat users fairly. An exchange-integrated prop program could offer more transparency about whether trades reach real markets (they would execute on the exchange's order books), more reliable payouts (backed by the exchange's balance sheet), and clearer regulatory status.

We may also see hybrid models emerge. Some firms might offer instant funding for traders with proven track records on other platforms, bypassing evaluations entirely. Others might create tiered systems where passing an initial evaluation opens doors to progressively larger accounts or different profit splits. The model could expand beyond spot and derivatives trading into other areas like market making or liquidity provision.

Traditional financial institutions might adopt elements of this approach. Hedge funds and proprietary trading desks have always struggled with talent identification. A systematic evaluation platform that filters thousands of candidates to find the few with genuine edge could be valuable even for firms that currently rely on traditional hiring. This would bring prop firm methodology into institutional finance rather than keeping it at the retail edge.

Asset Class Expansion: From Forex to Everything

Prop firms originated in forex and have recently expanded to crypto through platforms like Breakout. The logical next frontier is equities, options, and other traditional securities. Some firms are already offering stock trading evaluations, though regulatory barriers are higher for securities than for forex or crypto.

The expansion into crypto specifically makes strategic sense. Cryptocurrency markets operate 24/7, offer significant volatility (creating profit opportunities), and have less regulatory complexity than traditional securities in many jurisdictions. For traders, crypto prop accounts offer exposure to an emerging asset class without the capital intensity of holding positions through volatile swings.

If the model succeeds in crypto, expect further diversification. Commodities, bonds, and even newer categories like tokenized real-world assets could become available through prop firm platforms. The core logic (demonstrate skill, receive funding, share profits) transfers across asset classes. The evaluation criteria would need to adjust for different market characteristics, but the fundamental structure remains viable.

Conclusion: Trading's Uncomfortable Evolution

The rise of proprietary trading firms represents an uncomfortable truth about modern capitalism: talent is abundant but capital is scarce and unequally distributed. Prop firms exploit this asymmetry by making capital available on harsh terms that favor the house while claiming to democratize opportunity.

Both narratives contain truth. For the small percentage of traders who pass evaluations and maintain profitable funded accounts, prop firms have provided life-changing access to capital that traditional finance never would have granted. These are genuine success stories that validate the model's meritocratic claims. For the overwhelming majority who pay fees and never receive funding, prop firms have extracted money in exchange for the opportunity to prove themselves against deliberately difficult standards.

Kraken's acquisition of Breakout suggests the model is entering a new phase. Institutional involvement brings legitimacy, regulatory infrastructure, and integration with established financial services. This could clean up the industry's worst excesses while mainstreaming the talent evaluation approach. Or it could simply provide a veneer of respectability to what remains fundamentally an expensive filter where most people lose.

What's certain is that prop firms are not disappearing. The appeal is too strong for both sides: firms generate revenue from evaluation fees and profit shares, while aspiring traders are willing to pay for chances at capital access. The question is whether evolution toward regulation and institutional integration will create a fairer version of this model or whether the economic reality (high failure rates, fee-driven revenue) will persist regardless of who operates the platforms.

For the crypto industry specifically, prop trading integration represents another step in maturation. Cryptocurrency began as a technological and philosophical experiment in decentralized money. It evolved into a speculative asset class. Now it is becoming a comprehensive financial system with derivatives, lending, and increasingly, institutionalized talent development through prop trading programs.

The uncomfortable truth is that capitalism has always been about filtering for competence and rewarding the few who survive those filters. Prop firms have not invented anything new; they have simply made the filter visible, quantifiable, and commercially available for a fee. Whether this represents progress or exploitation depends on whether you are the one writing the check or collecting it.

As the industry evolves under regulatory pressure and institutional involvement, perhaps a middle ground will emerge: more transparent pass rates, fairer evaluation criteria, regulated payout obligations, and genuine talent development that justifies the costs. Until then, prop firms remain a high-stakes bet where aspiring traders wager that they are exceptional enough to join the profitable minority, while firms profit from every attempt regardless of outcome. In this sense, they are a perfect mirror of capitalism itself: promising opportunity, demanding proof, and enriching those who control the filter.

References and Further Reading

[1] FTMO. "FTMO is the winner of Deloitte FAST 50!" FTMO Blog. https://ftmo.com/en/ftmo-is-the-winner-of-deloitte-fast-50/

[2] JDSupra. "My Forex Funds Lawsuit: Warning to the Proprietary Trading Sector." Barnea Jaffa Lande & Co. https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/my-forex-funds-lawsuit-warning-to-the-4332455/

[3] Finance Magnates. "FTMO Acquires OANDA from CVC: Plans to Operate It as a Standalone Business." Finance Magnates, January 2025. https://www.financemagnates.com/forex/ftmo-acquires-oanda-from-cvc-plans-to-operate-it-as-a-standalone-business/

[4] FTMO. "The year 2021 in numbers." FTMO Blog. https://ftmo.com/en/year-2021-in-numbers/

[5] Global Trading. "The Big Prop Trading Crackdown: Good news or bad?" Global Trading, 2024. https://www.globaltrading.net/the-big-prop-trading-crackdown-good-news-or-bad/

[6] Best Prop Firms. "Prop Trading Statistics 2025 - Prop Firm Trends and Growth." Best Prop Firms, 2025. https://www.bestpropfirms.com/guides/prop-trading-stats/

[7] Finance Magnates. "Exclusive: 80–100 Prop Firms Shut Down in 2024's Industry Reshuffle." Finance Magnates, December 2024. https://www.financemagnates.com/forex/exclusive-80-100-prop-firms-wiped-out-in-2024s-industry-collapse/

[8] Finance Magnates. "Exclusive: 80–100 Prop Firms Shut Down in 2024's Industry Reshuffle." Finance Magnates, December 2024. https://www.financemagnates.com/forex/exclusive-80-100-prop-firms-wiped-out-in-2024s-industry-collapse/

[9] Business Wire. "Kraken Completes Major Acquisition of Breakout to Offer Prop Trading to Clients Globally." Business Wire, September 2025. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250904012956/en/Kraken-Completes-Major-Acquisition-of-Breakout-to-Offer-Prop-Trading-to-Clients-Globally

[10] Kraken Blog. "Get funded to trade crypto: Kraken x Breakout is live." Kraken Blog, September 2025. https://blog.kraken.com/news/kraken-acquires-breakout

[11] Blockworks. "Kraken acquires Breakout to expand prop trading services." Blockworks, September 2025. https://blockworks.co/news/kraken-acquires-breakout

[12] FundingTraders Blog. "FTMO Suspends Challenges In The United States - Banned Countries List." FundingTraders Blog, 2023. https://blog.fundingtraders.com/ftmo-prop-firm-suspends-challenges-us/

[13] Reuters. "Judge sanctions CFTC over agency's conduct in My Forex Funds case." Reuters, May 2025. https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/judge-sanctions-cftc-over-agencys-conduct-my-forex-funds-case-2025-05-14/

[14] Finance Magnates. "My Forex Funds Hints at Comeback After Winning Legal Battle Against CFTC." Finance Magnates, May 2025. https://www.financemagnates.com/forex/myforexfunds-hints-at-comeback-after-winning-legal-battle-against-cftc/

[15] Finance Magnates. "This Prop Firm's $85M Vanished Overnight amid Allegations of a Potential Scam and Cloning." Finance Magnates, November 2024. https://www.financemagnates.com/forex/this-prop-firms-85m-vanished-overnight-amid-allegations-of-a-potential-scam-and-cloning/

Last updated: October 22, 2025